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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 900484-CA 
v. s 
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, t Category No. 2 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Court's request, the State submits this 
brief in response to defendant's petition for rehearing. A 
petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court has 
overlooked pertinent facts or law, or has misapplied or 
misinterpreted the law. See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT I 
This Court should decline defendant's invitation to 
assume the trial court made findings of fact in accordance with 
its conclusion that a pretext stop occurred and to affirm the 
suppression order. The trial court's findings of fact are 
inadequate under State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah App. 
1990), and, contrary to defendant's suggestion, this Court cannot 
reasonably assume the trial court actually made findings 
necessary to support the pretext conclusion, see State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991). 
As is evident from the briefs filed by both parties, 
there are a number of ambiguities in this record, and it is the 
trial court's obligation to sort out those ambiguities and to 
enter clear findings of fact. Just as in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
788, the record evidence does not clearly support the trial 
court's ruling, and therefore the remand ordered by this Court is 
appropriate. See also State v. Vigil, 817 P.2d 1296, 1301-02 
(Utah App. 199l).1 Therefore, rehearing should be denied on 
1
 In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Russon 
argues that there is no need to remand for more complete findings 
in light of the undisputed evidence that the officer stopped 
defendant for making a turn without signaling and driving without 
a driver's license, violations of state statutes and offenses for 
which officers routinely stop drivers. State v. Lopez, No. 
900484-CA, slip op. at 19 and n.l (Utah App. Mar. 2, 1992) 
(Russon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah App. 1989)). However, 
the trial court's written findings of fact are not sufficiently 
clear as to the officer's prior contacts with defendant and the 
officer's observation of an improper turn to support Judge 
Russon's argument, even though the State obviously would favor 
his approach. 
The trial court's findings of fact, as written, suggest 
that the court did not believe certain parts of the officer's 
testimony — e.g., the court found (1) that "[t]here was no 
testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer 
Hamner as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," and (2) 
that "Officer Hamner observed defendant make a left turn and says 
he did not see a signal," Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 2 (R. 28) (emphasis added). Thus, it is not clear this 
Court was free to state as an unqualified fact that "[tjhe 
individual Officer Hamner believed to be Cruz had also introduced 
himself to Officer Hamner," Lopez, slip op. at 2, or to observe 
that "[t]he trial court intimated nothing which would suggest the 
court found [Officer Hamner's] testimony not credible," id. at 11 
n.12. In short, the trial court's poorly drafted findings, which 
refer to testimony or the absence thereof on certain points 
(rather than making an actual finding on the question of fact — 
e.g., "The court finds that defendant did not ever represent 
himself as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz" or "The 
court finds that defendant did not [or did] signal before he made 
a turn"), are inadequate and require clarification. 
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this issue. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT II 
Defendant's argument concerning burden of proof does 
not present grounds for rehearing. It simply reflects 
dissatisfaction with the rule constructed by the Court, without 
citation to any controlling authority that compels a different 
rule. Accordingly, the Court should not grant rehearing on the 
burden of proof issue. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT III 
The Court should grant rehearing on the issue of what 
role an officer's subjective intent plays in the pretext 
analysis. Defendant correctly points out that the majority's 
opinion on this subject is extremely confusing. The State agrees 
with defendant, albeit for different reasons, that the majority's 
analysis is internally inconsistent and requires clarification. 
The majority began its analysis of the subjective 
intent question by correctly stating the law: "[T]he issue of 
whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop cannot turn on the issue 
of an officer's subjective intent, but rather, must turn on the 
objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have 
made the stop under the same circumstances absent the illegal 
motivation. . . . Further, a forus on an individual officer's 
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext 
would violate the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the 
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police 
activity." State v. Lopez. No. 900484-CA, slip op. at 10 (Utah 
3 
App. Mar. 2, 1992). It then properly concluded that "[t]he trial 
court incorrectly focused on the officer's subjective motivation 
while ignoring whether the officer would have made the stop 
regardless of that motivation." .Id. at 11. However, in its 
discussion of "relevant evidence" which follows these correct 
statements and application of the law, the majority's analysis 
begins to break down. 
Throughout its opinion, the majority appears to define 
the "would have stopped" prong of the pretext test as whether the 
particular officer or officers in general routinely stop for the 
offense in issue. For example, in discussing what evidence is 
relevant to the pretext inquiry, the majority stated: 
Simply put, if an officer testifies to 
routinely making stops for a particular 
offense, it tends to show the stop was 
objectively reasonable; if the officer admits 
to having never before stopped a driver for 
the offense, it tends to show a reasonable 
officer would not have made the stop. . . . 
In addition to evaluating the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, a 
trial court may also properly consider 
evidence of the normal practices of other 
police officers under similar circumstances, 
as well as indications of departmental 
policy. 
Lopez, slip op. at 14. When analyzing the burden of proof issue, 
it observed: 
[B]ecause the State has the primary access to 
most of the relevant evidence, including the 
officer's past stop practices and the 
practices of other officers, we believe the 
burden of proof is properly placed on the 
State. . . . The State may easily meet its 
burden by introducing the testimony of the 
arresting officer's justifications for the 
actual stop and the officer's normal 
4 
practices. Absent some concession that the 
stop was outside normal practice, this may be 
all that is necessary. . . . A defendant 
might also rebut the State's evidence by 
introducing evidence that other officers 
normally do not stop vehicles for the same 
infractions or that stopping for such 
infractions is at odds with departmental 
policy or practice. • . . Only a small 
minor ty of traffic stop cases implicate the 
pretext doctrine when the focus is on 
"whether a reasonable officer would have made 
the stop absent the illegal motivation." In 
clear-cut cases, as mentioned earlier, of 
driving eighty miles-per-hour in a school 
zone or consuming alcohol while driving, 
common knowledge suggests that reasonable 
officers everywhere routinely stop such 
offenders. In such cases, the pretext 
doctrine cannot be asserted in good faith and 
can be dismissed quickly by trial judges. 
Id. at 15-16 and nn. 17 & 18. The apparent sum total of the 
majority's statements is that the "would have stopped" prong is 
decided by determining whether the stop for the particular 
violation is consistent with usual or routine police practice. 
Indeed, that is precisely the test the Tenth Circuit enunciated 
in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988), 
a case cited by the majority as support for retention of the 
pretext doctrine, see Lopez, slip op. at 5, 6. 
Nevertheless, in a mystifying footnote, the majority, 
while acknowledging the Court's previous statement that the 
officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant2, holds that 
evidence of an officer's subjective intent is "relevant to what a 
reasonable officer would do under the circumstances." Lopez, 
2
 State v. Sierra, 752 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988), 
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). 
5 
slip op. at 12 n.14. In reaching this conclusion, the majority 
notes that Sierra "correctly observed an officer's subjective 
intent is not the relevant legal standard or inquiry a court 
should use to determine if a stop is pretextual," but explains 
that "this statement was not made in the context of what evidence 
may be relevant to what a reasonable officer would do under the 
circumstances," Ibid, This cannot be true, for the entire 
pretext doctrine is premised upon what the hypothetical 
reasonable officer would do under the circumstances. See Sierra, 
754 P.2d at 977-79; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517. Put another way, 
the "legal standard or inquiry" for pretext cannot be separated 
from the inquiry of what a reasonable officer would do under the 
circumstances. 
Thus, if the pretext standard is truly an objective 
standard, which looks to the usual or routine police practice for 
what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do (as it must), the 
subjective intent of the officer has no relevance. Subjective 
motivation (whether good or bad) simply has no bearing on what is 
the usual police practice, which will necessarily be established 
through the detaining officer's testimony, the testimony of other 
officers, and documentary evidence concerning departmental 
policy. For example, when a pretext challenge is made to a stop 
for failure to signal before making a turn, it does not matter 
that the officer also had a "hunch" the driver might be involved 
in a recent burglary; the only consideration is whether officers 
routinely stop for that traffic violation. State v. Smith, 781 
6 
P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989) (stop for failing to signal before 
making turn not pretextual, as "this is the type of clear cut 
traffic violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and 
issue citations;" "fact that [officer]'s attention was initially 
drawn to the defendant's car because of what he considered 
suspicious activity in a high-crime area does not insulate the 
defendant from being stopped for a traffic violation"). Nor 
would it be of any consequence that the officer in the foregoing 
scenario had no interest beyond the traffic violation in making 
the stop; again, the only consideration is whether the stop 
comports with usual police practice. 
In sum, although the majority has genuinely sought to 
clarify the pretext doctrine, the State agrees with defendant 
that its holding regarding evidence of the officer's subjective 
intent is extremely confusing and requires clarification. 
Because consistent and intelligent application of the pretext 
doctrine in the lower courts depends on clear direction from this 
Court, and since the Lopez decision will likely represent the 
seminal case from this Court on the pretext doctrine, the Court 
should grant rehearing on the subjective intent issue, request 
additional briefing from the parties, and restore the case to the 
calendar for reargument. Utah R. App. P. 35(c). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing only on the issue of the relevance of the officer's 
subjective intent. The Court should request additional briefing 
7 
from the parties on that issue and restore the case to the 
calendar for reargument. Utah R. App. P. 35(c). 
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